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Muller: Electoral Votes Regularly Given

ELECTORAL VOTES REGULARLY GIVEN
Derek T. Muller*
Every four years, Congress convenes to count presidential
electoral votes. In recent years, members of Congress have
objected or attempted to object to the counting of electoral votes
on the ground that those votes were not “regularly given.” That
language comes from the Electoral Count Act of 1887. But the
phrase “regularly given” is a term of art, best understood as
“cast pursuant to law.” It refers to controversies that arise after
the appointment of presidential electors, when electors cast
their votes and send them to Congress. Yet members of Congress
have incorrectly used the objection to challenge an assortment
of pre-appointment controversies that concern the underlying
election itself. This Essay identifies the proper meaning of the
phrase “regularly given,” articulates the narrow universe of
appropriate objections within that phrase, and highlights why
the failure to object with precision ignores constraints on
congressional power.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2021, Congress began counting electoral votes, as
it does every four years. When Vice President Mike Pence read the
certificate of the vote of the state of Arizona, Representative Paul
Gosar stood to object to the certification, and the Clerk of the House
read aloud the objection: “We, a Member of the House of
Representatives and a United States Senator, object to the counting
of the electoral votes of the State of Arizona on the ground that they
were not, under all of the known circumstances, regularly given.”1
Senator Ted Cruz joined this objection and took a slight bow as
those in favor of the objection cheered.2
The problem? It wasn’t the proper objection. Messrs. Gosar and
Cruz didn’t challenge the regularity of the votes. They were
challenging the certification process behind the choice of the
electors.3 It was the latest in a string of twenty-first century legal
errors, replicated later that day by Representative Scott Perry and
Senator Josh Hawley.4 It was the same error committed by
Representative Stephanie Tubbs Jones and Senator Barbara Boxer
in 2005,5 and the same error attempted by myriad Democrats in
2001 and 2017.6 It reflects a paucity of understanding about what
“regularly given” electoral votes are—and what they are not.
The Electoral Count Act of 18877 sets forth the procedures for
counting electoral votes. The Senate joins the House in a special
1 167 CONG. REC. H77 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Rep. Paul Gosar and Sen. Ted
Cruz).
2 For a brief video of these events, see NBC News, Republicans Object to Counting of
Electoral College Votes from Arizona, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/wat
ch?v=NBOVyfjuExY&ab_channel=NBCNews.
3 See Brian Naylor, Arizona Is 1st State for Republican Elector Challenge, NPR (Jan. 6,
2021, 1:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/congress-electoral-college-tally-live-updates/20
21/01/06/953931288/arizona-is-1st-state-for-republican-elector-challenge (noting that the
challenge to state certification was a challenge “to Arizona’s electors”).
4 167 CONG. REC. H98 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Rep. Scott Perry and Sen. Josh
Hawley).
5 151 CONG. REC. 198 (2005) (statement of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones and Sen. Barbara
Boxer) (“We . . . object to the counting of the electoral votes of the State of Ohio on the ground
that they were not, under all of the known circumstances, regularly given.”).
6 See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H188 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017) (detailing Texas Rep. Sheila
Jackson Lee’s objection to North Carolina’s electoral certification for Donald Trump).
7 Pub. L. No. 49-90, 24 Stat. 373.
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joint session.8 Section 15 of the Act opaquely offers the President of
the Senate an opportunity to “call for objections, if any” to the
reading of the certificate of the electoral votes of a state.9 Objections
must be “in writing,” and “state clearly and concisely, and without
argument, the ground thereof.”10 The Senate withdraws from the
joint meeting, and each chamber debates whether to sustain the
objection.11 It requires the agreement of both chambers to sustain
an objection.12
In particular, when one slate of electoral votes has been received,
Section 15 explains:
[N]o electoral vote or votes from any State which shall
have been regularly given by electors whose
appointment has been lawfully certified to according to
section 6 of this title from which but one return has been
received shall be rejected, but the two Houses
concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they
agree that such vote or votes have not been so regularly
given by electors whose appointment has been so
certified.13
“Lawfully certified” is best understood as referring to the state’s
process of certification. It includes congressional deference to states
that resolve controversies over the appointment of electors six days
before the electors meet.14 In contrast, “regularly given” refers to the
“votes,” and it suggests a narrower scope—one that has not been the
focus of congressional objections in recent years.15
The distinction matters. After the “determination” of the
“appointment”16 of presidential electors, those electors are identified
in a “certificate of . . . ascertainment of the electors appointed,”17
3 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., supra notes 1, 4–6 and accompanying text.
16 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2018).
17 Id. § 6.
8
9
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which is transmitted to Congress. If a state has resolved all
controversies over the appointment of electors at least six days
before the Electoral College meets—the “safe harbor” deadline18—
such appointment “shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and
as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors
appointed by such State is concerned.”19 If Congress objects to a
state’s electoral votes on the grounds that they were not “lawfully
certified,” it must first address the question of the safe harbor
deadline. And if a state has “lawfully certified” pursuant to the Act,
those votes “shall” not be rejected.
In the 2020 election, Arizona represented that all controversies
were resolved by December 8, 2020—the safe harbor deadline—
even as other court challenges remained pending.20 If a member of
Congress wanted to challenge whether the state’s election was
“lawfully certified,” it must overcome the Electoral Count Act’s “safe
harbor” rule that the state’s resolution “shall be conclusive.”
Electoral votes “regularly given,” however, have no such condition.
In one respect, this Essay’s claim is modest. It assumes
Congress’s power (1) to count electoral votes and (2) to determine
whether to count electoral votes—two assumptions that have been
questioned in recent years.21 If Congress has that power, it can
define how it goes about exercising it, including through the
Electoral Count Act. And so, this Essay examines only how the
phrase “regularly given” in the Act should be construed. Congress
may have broader power, or it may choose to limit its power—but,
for purposes of this Essay, the text of the Act drives the analysis.

18 See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Restraining Judicial Application of the “Safe Harbor”
Provision in the Electoral Count Act, 81 OHIO STATE L.J. ONLINE 221 (2020) (arguing that
this provision is merely a rule for how Congress will count electoral votes and should not be
interpreted as a judicially enforceable or binding rule on state legislatures).
19 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2018).
20 DOUGLAS A. DUCEY, CERTIFICATE OF ASCERTAINMENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS
(2020), https://www.archives.gov/files/ascertainment-arizona.pdf.
21 I sketch out justifications for Congress’s power in Scrutinizing Federal Electoral
Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559 (2015).
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II. THE MEANING OF “REGULARLY GIVEN”
The definition of “regularly given” in the Electoral Count Act has
been elusive.22 But, as this Part will show, the best understanding
of “regularly given” is “cast pursuant to law,” with “law” referring
to the federal Constitution, federal law,23 and state law.
A. HISTORICAL USE OF “REGULARLY GIVEN” IN LAW

“Regularly given” is a legal phrase that was routinely used in the
late nineteenth century. Notice was “regularly given.”24 Taxes were
“regularly given.”25 A judgment could be “regularly given.”26

22 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An Exercise in
Election Risk Assessment and Management, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 309, 352–53 (2019) (noting
that there may be “confusion or disagreement” over what “regularly given” means); Vasan
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (2002)
(“The meaning of the phrase ‘regularly given’ in § 15 is far from clear.” (footnote omitted)).
23 For present purposes, this Essay sets aside the debate about the extent to which
Congress can bind itself. The Electoral Count Act—at the very least—provides guidance for
Congress about how to behave when counting electoral votes. If Congress chooses a different
set of rules, it should be explicit when doing so, rather than act as if it is operating within the
existing rules.
24 See, e.g., Banet v. Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co., 13 Ill. 504, 507 (1851) (“Notice was
regularly given of the opening of the books for the subscription of the capital stock.”);
Ostrander v. Darling, 27 N.E. 353, 355 (N.Y. 1891) (“They are therefore brought within the
express provisions of the act which makes them conclusive evidence that the notice to redeem
was regular, and regularly given and published, according to law.”); Baker v. Pike, 33 Me.
213, 214 (1851) (“The notice given to the attorney during the trial to produce that writ was
ineffectual and unimportant; and any notice more seasonably and regularly given would have
been equally so, because that writ does not appear to have been in the possession of the
plaintiff, or subject to his control.”); Bennett v. Brundage, 8 Minn. 432, 432–33 (1863) (“This
notice was regularly published up to the 28th of January, 1859, on which day the sale was
postponed to the 5th day of March, 1859, at the same hour and place, of which postponement,
notice, in connection with the original notice, was regularly given and published to 5th day of
March, when the sale occurred.”); Ex parte Dickson, 64 Ala. 188, 189 (1879) (stating “that
notice of the settlement was regularly given, and the parties in interest appeared in court on
that day”).
25 See, e.g., Ordinary for Use of E.H. Worrill v. Adams, 44 Ga. 347, 350 (1871) (“Provided,
that said debt has been regularly given in for taxes and the taxes paid, it shall be a condition
precedent to recovery on the same . . . .”).
26 See, e.g., Hemingway v. Peter, 25 Mich. 202, 204 (1872) (“Wherever that rule is
applicable, it is evident that no final judgment as to costs can be regularly given until the
amount of damages is found.”); Thompson v. Reasoner, 24 N.E. 223, 224 (Ind. 1890) (“A
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Testimony can be “regularly given.”27 In context, it simply means
some act or exchange that arises pursuant to law. The “given” also
suggests a transfer from one to another—notice to an opposing
party, taxes to the one who holds the debt, a judgment to the parties.
And the “regularity” of the “giving,” in these historical contexts,
means that the “giving” occurred according to law.
Consider one gloss in Georgia in 1872: “But does ‘regularly given
in for taxes’ mean given in each year for taxes? ‘Regularly given in’
surely means given in according to rule; law is a rule of action. Then,
according to law, what is the law applicable to such a case?”28
In these contexts, the phrase is also used to describe the act or
exchange itself, and not the circumstances behind it. A judgment,
for instance, could be “regularly given,” even if in error.29 Notice to
request the production of a document could be “regularly given,”
even if the notice could not be complied with because a party lacked
possession of the document.30
The best construction of votes “regularly given” is that the votes
were cast pursuant to law. It does not look at the circumstances
behind the votes. Instead, it merely looks at the votes themselves.
B. ACADEMIC DISCUSSION OF “REGULARLY GIVEN”

Professor Beverly Ross and William Josephson focus on the
statute’s legislative history to support the view that “regularly
given” means “lawful.”31 Their scrutiny of contemporaneous history
supports the argument that “regularly given” refers to postjudgment regularly given, although it may be erroneous, is nevertheless the act of the court;
and any one who proceeds to enforce it may avail himself of its protection until it is
reversed.”); Multnomah St. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 9 P. 402, 402 (Or. 1886) (“The judgment against
the said Rothschild and M.M. Harris appears to have been regularly given, and I think is
valid beyond question . . . .”).
27 See, e.g., Laramie Coal & Ice Co. v. Eastman, 38 P. 680, 681 (Wyo. 1894) (“The testimony,
having been regularly given under the sanction of an oath, does not lose the character of a
deposition because the witness failed to subscribe it.”).
28 Macon & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Little, 45 Ga. 370, 383 (1872).
29 Thompson, 24 N.E. at 224.
30 Baker v. Pike, 33 Me. 213, 214 (1851).
31 See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12
J.L. & POL. 665, 729 (1996) (“[L]egislative history confirms the textual analysis. Congress
asserted power to determine who the lawful electors are and if their votes are regularly given
or lawful. No substantive distinction between ‘regularly given’ and ‘lawful’ was made.”).
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appointment controversies, not pre-appointment ones. Consider the
views of a nineteenth century contemporary:
[T]he law authorizes the two Houses by concurrent
resolution to reject the votes of the electors for President
and Vice-President if they agree that these have not
been regularly given; i.e., the two Houses cannot reject
the return on account of fraud or defect in the election
of the electors or in the determination of a controversy
thereover, but may do so on account of irregular action
on the part of the electors themselves in giving their
votes for President and Vice-President.32
Their conclusion, however, would limit Congress’s power not to
count votes. Congress would only have power not to count votes
when “explicit constitutional requirements are violated”;33 and only
in instances where “a state itself has not authoritatively determined
the question” of an elector’s appointment or where a state has, by
statute, expressly provided the conditions that votes are not
“regularly given,” such as the act of a faithless elector.34
Professor Stephen Siegel’s impressive work on the Electoral
Count Act likewise distinguishes between “post-appointment” and
“pre-appointment” controversies.35 He contends that the Act
reserves to Congress the power to reject electoral votes when they
are not “regularly given” (that is, post-appointment) or when the
governor has not “lawfully certified” the electors’ appointment (that
is, pre-appointment).36 Professor Siegel identifies the “regularly
given” exception as extending to those circumstances in which “the
electors’ conduct in office violated constitutional or statutory
requirements.”37

John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 633, 649 (1888).
Ross & Josephson, supra note 31, at 713; see also id. at 746 (“Congress should refuse to
count elector votes only in cases of constitutional irregularities.”).
34 Id. at 746.
35 See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral
Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541 (2004) (outlining the Act’s provisions as they were
originally understood by the enacting Congresspersons).
36 Id. at 616, 619.
37 Id. at 627.
32
33
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Vasan Kesavan, whose lengthy article rejects the Electoral
Count Act’s constitutionality, argues that “regularly given” should
be construed “narrowly,” and should extend “only to include
problems of the electoral certificate and to exclude problems of the
electoral vote, clarifying that the joint convention may judge the
authenticity of the electors’ acts, but not the electors’ acts
themselves.”38 But this interpretation stems not from the Electoral
Count Act itself. Instead, this interpretation arises from a gloss
Kesavan believes saves the Act from what he argues is an otherwise
unconstitutional scope.39
Yet all commenters, regardless of methodology, agree that
“regularly given” means something narrower than any legal
disapproval of the electoral votes cast by a state.
C. A NARROW SCOPE FOR “REGULARLY GIVEN”

Members of Congress should heed what “regularly given” means,
and how to distinguish it from other objections that might reside
elsewhere in the Electoral Count Act—or maybe nowhere at all.
Congress could amend the Act to specify those circumstances in
which votes might not have been “regularly given.” One could
imagine a circumstance where this list would fail to communicate
the relevant information to Congress, and Congress would refuse to
count the votes. Counting the votes is largely (and rightly) a
ministerial task in the contemporary era. But residual—even if
remote—opportunities exist to consider whether to count votes.
These opportunities are few, as there are few opportunities to
challenge electoral votes after the electors have been appointed.
And even in the absence of amending the statute, members of
Congress should heed the following categories as appropriate
objections in situations when electoral votes might not be “regularly
given.”
First, the elector cast a vote for a candidate ineligible to be
elected to that office. The president must be a natural born citizen,
at least thirty-five years of age, and fourteen years a resident of the

Kesavan, supra note 22, at 1811.
See id. (noting that this narrow construction is part of a revision to make the Act
constitutional).
38
39
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United States.40 No person constitutionally ineligible to the office of
president is eligible to be vice president.41 A dead candidate is
ineligible, and Congress might validly choose not to count votes for
that candidate.42 Congress could refuse to count votes for a
candidate who was impeached and barred from future office, or
whose conduct resulted in disqualification under the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 These two categories are more controversial in the
scope and circumstance of application to the office of president, but
it remains, in my judgment, squarely with the House to determine
eligibility.
If the elector votes for candidates who both reside in the elector’s
state, Congress also must develop a remedy—disqualify one vote or
both. In the face of an otherwise ambiguous record, state electors in
the past have clarified that no voters may cast two votes for
candidates. In 1872, for instance, Benjamin Gratz Brown was a
Missouri native; Missouri’s fifteen electors cast eight votes for
Brown for president, six votes for Thomas Hendricks, and one vote
for David Davis. They then cast six votes for Brown for vice
president, five votes for George Julian, three votes for John M.
Palmer, and one vote for William Groesbeck.44 In theory, up to six
electors could have cast votes for Brown for both president and vice
president. Because Brown was a Missouri inhabitant, those votes
would have been invalid. But Missouri submitted an explanation
with its list of electoral votes: “And it is hereby further certified that
none of said electors who voted for B. Gratz Brown for President

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; cf. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 119–20 (1800) (debating a bill
prescribing the method of deciding disputed presidential elections).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
42 Congress, for instance, refused to count electors’ votes cast for Horace Greeley after
Greeley had died. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1286–87, 1297–98 (1873) (rejecting
the electoral votes of states that voted for Horace Greeley). That said, the Twentieth
Amendment’s succession rules may incline Congress toward counting such votes in the future
and allowing the succession process to play out. See generally John Rogan, Reforms for
Presidential Candidate Death and Disability from the Conventions to Inauguration Day
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (arguing for Congress to change the line of succession
to respond to when the presidential nominee dies before inauguration).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“No Person shall . . . hold any office . . . under the
United States, or under any State, who . . . shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.”).
44 ELECTORAL VOTE RECORDS OF THE 42D CONGRESS (1872) (on file with author).
40
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voted for him for Vice President.”45 Upon learning of this
certification, the objection was dropped, and Congress counted
Missouri’s electoral votes.46
Second, the elector cast a vote at the wrong time or in the wrong
place. Congress fixes the “[d]ay on which” electors give their votes.47
Federal law specifies that date as the “first Monday after the second
Wednesday in December.”48 The U.S. Constitution is silent as to the
place or the specific time, but states determine both, and federal law
expressly directs states to determine the place electors should
meet.49 In 1856, five Wisconsin electors were unable to cast their
votes on the day prescribed by law due to a blizzard, so they cast
their votes the next day when they arrived in Madison.50 Their votes
were counted in Congress over several objections.51
Third, the elector cast a vote in the wrong manner. The manner
of holding elections includes voting by ballot,52 and voting for
president and vice president by distinct, separated ballots.53 In the
past, disputes have bubbled up over whether electors cast their
votes according to law. Mississippi’s votes in 1872, for instance,
were challenged on the grounds that the electors failed to vote by
ballot, but the votes were ultimately counted.54
Fourth, the electors did not report their votes to Congress
according to law. The Twelfth Amendment instructs electors to
“make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1300 (1873).
Id.
47 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4; see also Siegel, supra note 35, at 670 (identifying a possible
basis for an objection as a vote that was not cast “on the day set by federal law”).
48 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2018).
49 Id.
50 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 660 (1857) (statement of Mr. Jones) (“[T]he reason
why they did not assemble on the prescribed day was in consequence of the terrific storm by
which their progress was impeded, and which prevented them from reaching the seat of
government in time to cast their votes on the day prescribed by law.”).
51 See id. at 644–60 (explaining the happenings of 1856 election with respect to Wisconsin
electors).
52 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“[The Electors] shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President . . . .”); Siegel,
supra note 35, at 670 (describing as a post-appointment challenge a complaint that the elector
did not vote by ballot).
53 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (specifying the use of “distinct ballots”).
54 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1287–88 (1873).
45
46
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persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for
each.”55 Those lists are to be signed and certified by all electors, and
“transmit[ted] sealed to the seat of the government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate.”56 Congress has
further specified that the electors shall sign six certificates,57 seal
them,58 and dispose of them in a particular manner, including one
to the President of the U.S. Senate.59 If no votes are received by the
fourth Wednesday in December, the President of the Senate must
send a messenger to retrieve the list of votes.60 These tasks are
primarily ministerial. But if Congress does not receive the electoral
votes, it would be fair for Congress to conclude that it should not
count that state’s votes.
Fifth, the elector’s vote was the product of duress, bribery,
corruption, or other improper influence. If evidence surfaces after
the election that the electors were bribed or compelled by
extraneous influences in casting a vote, Congress might choose not
to count it.61 It could examine post-appointment influences to
determine whether the vote was freely given or the product of an
improper influence.
Each of these objections tracks an instance where the electoral
vote might not be “regularly given”—that is, not cast pursuant to
law. But they are a confined set of circumstances.

III. RECENT CONFUSION IN CONGRESS
This Essay has argued that “regularly given” refers to a limited
set of post-appointment controversies. If members of Congress wish
to object to a state’s electoral votes on the grounds that the votes
were not “regularly given,” they must rely on a narrow list of
categories. Members of Congress, however, have not been so
thoughtful.

U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Id.
57 3 U.S.C. § 9 (2018).
58 Id. § 10.
59 Id. § 11.
60 Id. § 12–13.
61 See Siegel, supra note 35, at 670 (describing “bribery or corruption” as a valid, postappointment challenge).
55
56
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No matter the form of the objection during the counting of
electoral votes, the President of the Senate must accept an improper
“regularly given” objection.62 This role is ministerial—upon a
written objection, the two chambers separate to debate the
objection.63
In 1969, Congress entertained the first formal objection under
the Electoral Count Act. A North Carolina elector cast a presidential
vote for George Wallace instead of Richard Nixon, whom he was
supposed to support.64 Members of Congress objected to counting
this vote as not “regularly given.” Senator Edmund Muskie argued
that the phrase “regularly given” “involves the vote,” and the state
had “no opportunity” to examine the regularity of the vote when the
secret ballots were cast.65 Senator Sam Ervin responded that the
vote was cast “regularly,” that is, “in the manner provided by the
Constitution.”66 During the debate, members of Congress routinely
cited law—including state law—for the proposition that the
electoral vote was cast according to law.67 Congress ultimately
62 See Siegel, supra note 35, at 650 n.667 (“[S]hould members of Congress object to receiving
a state’s vote on the ground that the vote was not regularly given because of concerns about
the way the votes in the presidential election were recounted by county canvassing boards,
the Senate President may not rule the objection out of order even though the objection that
the vote was not regularly given applies only to the electors’ post-appointment behavior.”).
63 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
64 See 115 CONG. REC. 198 (1969) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie) (“[O]nly one objection
will be filed . . . to the vote of the elector from North Carolina who was elected an elector on
a Nixon slate, but who cast his vote for George C. Wallace . . . .”).
65 Id. at 201.
66 Id. at 207.
67 See, e.g., id. at 164 (statement from the Deputy Att’y Gen. N.C.) (“[U]nder the North
Carolina statutes a presidential elector is not required to cast his vote for any particular
candidate.”); id. at 166 (statement of Mr. Fountain) (“There is no requirement in the
Constitution of the United States, the constitution of North Carolina, the United States Code,
or the statutes of North Carolina that binds a presidential elector to any one candidate. Nor
to my knowledge has a decision binding our electors been issued by any competent court.
Therefore, regardless of whether we agree or disagree with Dr. Bailey’s decision, Congress is
powerless to act as proposed.”); id. at 167 (statement of Mr. Wyman) (“At the Federal level
unless and until this is changed by constitutional amendment, or to a lesser extent within
the several States by State law, electors are legally free to vote as they individually see fit.”);
id. at 168 (statement of Mr. Fish) (“[N]either is there a requirement in the law of North
Carolina binding an elector to vote for the winner of the popular vote, nor was any challenge
to the elector’s action made in North Carolina.”); id. at 169 (statement of Mr. Schwengel) (“In
this case, North Carolina’s laws do not specifically bind the electors to the outcome of the
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counted the vote.68 Nevertheless, Congress’s formal objection was
appropriate for consideration: should Congress count the vote, or
was the vote not “regularly given”?69
In the twenty-first century, however, members of Congress began
to import the notion that “regularly given” included any objection to
the electors’ votes, pre-appointment or post-appointment. In other
words, members of Congress argued that votes were not “regularly
given,” even if those votes were cast pursuant to law.
In 2001, an attempted objection filed by Representative Sheila
Jackson-Lee and three other House members indicated that
Florida’s electoral votes were not “regularly given” due to an
incorrect certification from the Governor and due to violations of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.70 Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
filed another attempted objection that the votes were not “regularly
given” because a plurality of the votes were actually cast for Al Gore
and Joe Lieberman, not George W. Bush and Dick Cheney.71 These
attempted objections were never entertained because no member of
the Senate joined them.72
In 2005, Representative Stephanie Tubbs Jones and Senator
Barbara Boxer lodged an objection to Ohio’s electoral votes “on the
ground that they were not, under all of the known circumstances,
regularly given.”73 The heart of the objections, however, were that
the electors were “unlawfully appointed,” in the words of the
Democratic staff report of the House Judiciary Committee, led by

popular vote.”); id. at 202 (statement of Mr. Muskie) (“I understand that the statute is not
expressly binding.”); id. at 215–16 (statement of Mr. Mundt) (“Dr. Bailey broke no law,
because the only law that could be applicable to him as an elector would be the law of North
Carolina; and the law of North Carolina stands silent on the point.”).
68 See id. at 246 (showing that the Senate voted to reject the objection and count the vote).
69 Siegel, supra note 35, at 644 n.640.
70 147 CONG. REC. 123 (2001) (statements of Reps. Jackson-Lee, Meek, Johnson, and
Cummings); see also Siegel, supra note 35, at 617 n.462 (discussing this objection, but noting
that “this was an inappropriate ground for objecting” because “there was no post-appointment
misbehavior by Florida’s electors”).
71 147 CONG. REC. 123 (2001).
72 See id. at 101 (statement of Mr. Hutchinson) (“[T]he fact that no Senator has indicated a
willingness to join in that objection indicates that . . . we are ready to move on and accept the
results of the election . . . .”).
73 151 CONG. REC. 198 (2005).
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Representatives John Conyers.74 Debate turned on matters like
lines at the polling places, faulty voting machines, and other
allegations concerning the popular election in Ohio.75
In 2017, members of Congress attempted to object to the electoral
votes from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.76 Nearly every proffered reason focused on preappointment
controversies.
In
Alabama,
for
instance,
Representative McGovern complained that the certificate was not
“regularly given and that the electors were not lawfully certified,”
citing “illegal activities engaged in by the Government of Russia”
and “widespread violations of the Voting Rights Act.”77 Like in 2001,
no Senator joined the objections.78
Only one attempted objection came close to a post-appointment
controversy, but it was wrong on the facts and the law.
Representative Jackson-Lee explained that she opposed
Wisconsin’s electoral votes as not “regularly given,” because, inter
alia, the electors “fail[ed] to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 9, which requires
that ‘electors shall make and sign six certificates of all the votes
given by them, each of which certificates shall contain two distinct
lists, one of the votes for President and the other of the votes for
Vice President[.]’”79 Wisconsin’s electors, however, did have distinct
lists, albeit on a single certificate. “For President,” the certificate
identified 10 votes for Donald J. Trump; “For Vice President,” in a
separate tally below that, it identified 10 votes for Michael R.
Pence.80 Many other states do the same, offering two distinct lists

74 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. JUDICIARY COMM., PRESERVING DEMOCRACY: WHAT WENT
WRONG IN OHIO (2005), reprinted in 151 CONG. REC. 200, 217 (2005).
75 Id.
76 163 CONG. REC. H186–89 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017).
77 Id. at H186 (emphasis added).
78 See, e.g., id. (statement of Vice President Biden) (rejecting Rep. McGovern’s objection to
the certification of Alabama’s electoral votes because it was not signed by a Senator); supra
note 72.
79 Id. at E33 (alteration in original); see also id. at E32 (citing Article II, the Twelfth
Amendment, and 3 U.S.C. § 9 as the basis for the objection).
80 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS OF WIS., CERTIFICATE OF VOTE CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2016), https://www.archives.gov/files/electoralcollege/2016/vote-wisconsin.pdf.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 [2021], Art. 3

1544

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1529

on one single certificate.81 The Electoral Count Act anticipates this,
too, as the electors sign “six certificates of all the votes given by
them,” and “each” certificate contains “two distinct lists.”82 There is
no requirement for twelve certificates, nor six two-page certificates.
While Representative Jackson-Lee’s objection was wrong on both
the facts and the law, it was, at least, the only attempt to lodge an
objection citing a post-appointment controversy.
In 2021, Members of Congress claimed to examine postappointment “regularly given” electoral votes but actually focused
on substantive pre-appointment challenges,83 while others conflated
“regularly given” with “lawfully certified,” even though “lawfully
certified” was not the formal objection presented.84 The formal
objections to Arizona’s and Pennsylvania’s electors had a kitchen
sink quality to them, covering topics ranging from critiques of
judicial decisions ahead of the election to allegations of fraud.85
Members of Congress have with almost unwavering consistency
cited pre-appointment challenges as the basis for refusing to count
electoral votes. However, the ready-made objection in the Electoral
Count Act, and the one these congresspersons most commonly cite,
allows objections only to post-appointment disputes.86

81 See 2016 Electoral College Results, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/electoralcollege/2016 (last updated Jan. 11, 2021) (providing all 2016 Electoral College certifications
and votes by state).
82 3 U.S.C. § 9 (2018) (emphasis added).
83 See, e.g., 167 CONG. REC. S31 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Mrs. Lummis) (“I
remain deeply concerned that the electoral votes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were
not ‘regularly given’ under Pennsylvania law, as required by the Electoral Count Act. Serious
concerns have been raised about the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s vote-by-mail
statute.”).
84 See id. at H84 (statement of Mr. Johnson) (“Since we are convinced that the election laws
in Arizona and some other key States were changed in this unconstitutional manner, we have
a responsibility today. The slates of electors produced under those modified laws are thus
unconstitutional. They are not ‘regularly given’ or ‘lawfully certified,’ as required by the
Electoral Count Act, and they are invalid on their face.”).
85 See, e.g., id. at H85 (statement of Mr. Gosar) (stating that the Dominion voting machines
have “a documented history of enabling fraud”); id. at H91 (statement of Mr. Bishop)
(criticizing the “unreviewed decisions of State and Federal trial judges inclined by
partisanship or having limited experience with the Electoral Clause”).
86 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
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IV. “REGULARLY GIVEN” AND THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM
The form of the objection matters. Because “regularly given”
objections focus on post-appointment controversies, those objections
acknowledge the validity of an elector’s appointment in the first
place. An elector’s appointment is crucial to determining whether a
presidential candidate has received “a majority of the whole number
of Electors appointed,” as the Twelfth Amendment requires87—a
determination that sometimes is called the “denominator
problem.”88 That is, if there is a dispute about electoral votes, how
many votes are needed to yield a majority—and how many votes are
in the denominator when determining what is a majority?
Traditionally, if Congress rejects the appointment of the elector,
those votes are not included in the denominator.89 And if Congress
rejects the vote of a validly appointed elector, those votes are
included in the denominator.90
A. THE ELECTION OF 1872

One puzzle is how the electoral votes of Arkansas and Louisiana
were treated in the 1872 election. Congress decided whether to
count these votes under the twenty-second joint rule, not the

U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
See Neil H. Buchanan, Michael C. Dorf & Laurence Tribe, No, Republicans Cannot
Throw the Presidential Election into the House so That Trump Wins, VERDICT (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://verdict.justia.com/2020/09/30/no-republicans-cannot-throw-the-presidential-electioninto-the-house-so-that-trump-wins (noting that because the Twelfth Amendment only
requires a majority of electors “appointed,” even if a state’s electoral votes are not counted, a
candidate can still win the majority of electors actually appointed).
89 See id. (noting, in the context of the 2020 presidential election, that if Pennsylvania’s 20
electors were set aside, “its 20 votes [would be] subtracted from both the numerator and the
denominator,” allowing a candidate to win with just 268 electoral votes).
90 See ELIZABETH RYBICKI & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32717, COUNTING
ELECTORAL VOTES: AN OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURES AT THE JOINT SESSION, INCLUDING
OBJECTIONS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 4–5 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32717.pdf
(“In [1873], the two houses . . . had decided not to count the electoral votes from Arkansas
and Louisiana. Nonetheless, the number of electoral votes allocated to Arkansas and
Louisiana evidently were included in ‘the whole number of electoral votes’ for purposes of
determining whether President Grant had received the majority required for election.”).
87
88
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Electoral Count Act (which wasn’t enacted until 1887).91 The
precedent illuminates a potential ambiguity in congressional
treatment of electoral votes, but the better argument on the record
suggests that disputes over whether electors were properly
appointed removes those electors from the denominator of votes
cast.92
The objection to counting Arkansas’s votes was two-fold: (1) the
official returns of the election in Arkansas, made according to the
laws of that state, showed that the people certified by the secretary
of state as elected were not Arkansas’s electors, and (2) the returns
read by the tellers were not certified according to law.93
The House considered a lengthier resolution about Arkansas that
was replaced with a shorter resolution, “short and crisp”94 in the
style of the Senate: “Resolved, That the electoral vote of Arkansas
be counted.”95 The resolution passed the House 103–26, with 111
not voting.96 In the Senate, the question was presented “that the
vote of Arkansas shall not be counted,” which passed 28–24, with 21
not voting.97 Because the two houses could not agree to count the
votes, Arkansas’s electoral votes were not counted.
The form of the objection was the “vote . . . shall not be counted,”
but the objection really turned on two objections to the appointment
of the electors, suggesting they were not entitled to cast votes in the
first place. The objection claimed that the electors “were not
elected,” and that the returns declaring them electors “are not
certified according to law.”98 Either objection strikes at the
appointment of the electors. And if the electors never were
See Siegel, supra note 35, at 552–53 (describing the twenty-second joint rule, which gave
Congress unfettered “power to determine all questions regarding electoral votes”).
92 See RYBICKI & WHITAKER, supra note 90, at 4 (describing the treatment of these electoral
votes in the 1872 election as an “exception” to the denominator problem).
93 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1303 (1873) (statement of Sen. Rice) (“I object to
the counting of the votes of the State of Arkansas, because the official returns in said State,
made according to the laws of said State, show that the persons certified to by the secretary
of State as elected, were not elected as electors for President and Vice President at the election
held November 5, 1872; and secondly, because the returns read by the tellers are not certified
according to law.”).
94 Id. (statement of Mr. Garfield).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1303–04.
97 Id. at 1292.
98 Supra note 93.
91
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appointed, Arkansas never submitted anyone whose votes could be
counted in the first place.
The allocation of Louisiana’s electors was another point of
contention. Congress received two sets of returns. One, signed by
the secretary of state, identified electors who cast eight votes for
Grant for president and eight votes for Wilson for vice president.
Another, signed by the governor and the assistant secretary of state,
identified electors who presented eight blank ballots for president
and eight votes for Benjamin Gratz Brown for vice president.99
Seven members of Congress filed objections. Two objected to the
blank and Gratz electors.100 Three objected to the Grant and Wilson
electors.101 Two objected to counting any electors from the State of
Louisiana.102 After some back and forth, the Senate approved this
resolution: “Resolved, That all the objections presented having been
considered, no electoral vote purporting to be that of the State of
Louisiana be counted.”103 It was approved 33–16, with 24 absent.104
The House took much longer than the Senate, then haggling over
the resolution for Louisiana and the matter in dispute.105 The
Senate’s decision on Louisiana returned to the House, at which
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1302 (1873).
See id. at 1303 (statement of Sen. West) (“I object to the reception . . . of the electoral
vote . . . upon the ground that said certificate was not made in pursuance of law.”); id.
(statement of Mr. Sheldon) (“I also object to the counting of the votes cast . . . for the reason
that the certificate of the Governor showing them to have been chosen electors is not signed
by the person who was at that time assistant secretary of State . . . and for the further reason
that at the time said certificate was executed there had not been made any count, canvass, or
return of the votes cast . . . .”).
101 See id. (statement of Senator Carpenter) (objecting because (1) “there is no proper return
of votes cast,” (2) “no State government in said State . . . is republican in form,” and (3) “no
canvass or counting of the votes . . . had been made prior to the meeting of the electors”); id.
(statement of Mr. Potter) (objecting because there was “no certificate from the executive
authority of that State”); id. (statement of Senator Trumbull) (objecting because “their
election is not certified to by the proper officers; that Bovee, who signed the certificate . . .
was not secretary of State at the time of making said certificate, nor in possession of the office
of secretary of State nor of the seal of said State” and because the certificate “is untrue in
fact, as appears by the admissions of said Bovee before the committee of the Senate”).
102 See id. (statement of Mr. Stevenson) (objecting “because it does not sufficiently appear
that the electors were elected according to law”); id. (statement of Senator Boreman)
(objecting “for reasons set forth in the report of the Committee on Privileges and Elections”).
103 Id. at 1292.
104 Id. at 1293.
105 Id. at 1303–05.
99

100
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point the House, in the words of one member, recognizing “that the
electoral vote of Louisiana cannot be counted,”106 expeditiously
moved to adopt, “Resolved, That, in the judgment of this House,
none of the returns reported by the tellers as electoral votes of the
State of Louisiana should be counted.”107
Given two competing slates of electors, Louisiana’s electoral vote
hinged on which set Congress deemed validly appointed. The
decision to count neither set suggests that Congress could not agree
that anyone was lawfully appointed.108
The record, however, reflects competing interpretations. The
Congressional Globe records show 366 electoral votes, of which a
majority is 184.109 The House Journal reports the same: 366 as the
whole number of electors, of which a majority is 184.110
The Senate’s Journal, however, reflects that the tellers reported
that the whole number of electors appointed was 352, of which a
majority is 177.111 The 352 total excludes eight electoral votes from
Louisiana and six electoral votes from Arkansas.112 The actual
tellers’ sheets,113 as held by the National Archives, reflect the same.

Id. at 1305 (statement of Mr. Speer).
Id.
108 See id. (noting that “[t]he resolution was adopted”).
109 Id. at 1306.
110 H.R. JOURNAL, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 384 (1873).
111 S. JOURNAL, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 345–46 (1873); see also Siegel, supra note 35, at 654
n.680 (“The Senate’s and House’s disparity in treatment . . . is a troubling precedent,
particularly because it is the only occasion on which Congress rejected a state’s electoral vote,
rather than giving alternate counts or choosing between competing slates.”).
112 See id. at 345 (showing that Louisiana and Arkansas’s electoral votes were not
registered for either candidate or in the total number of electoral votes available).
113 Both images of the tellers’ sheets included below are drawn from ELECTORAL VOTE
RECORDS OF THE 42D CONGRESS (1872) (on file with author).
106
107
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The tellers’ sheet reflects that the tellers placed parentheticals
around Louisiana and Arkansas, and the tellers removed the preprinted “number of electoral votes” from the preceding column. The
bottom of the page had preprinted figures of 366 total votes and 184
as a majority. But the tellers wrote over those figures in ink with
the numbers 352 and 177.

The Congressional Research Service has identified the 1873
precedent as an “exception” to the rule.114 It notes that the
denominator for a “majority” was based on “the number of electoral

114

RYBICKI & WHITAKER, supra note 90, at 4.
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votes counted by the tellers.”115 Citing the Congressional Globe, the
Congressional Research Service noted the unusual reporting
identified above.116 But it need not be considered an exception. It is,
at the very least, an inconsistent reporting of Congress’s precedent
from the election. The best reading, in my judgment, is that the
teller sheets—the actual report from members of Congress tasked
with tabulating the votes—reflect the judgment of Congress,
regardless of what was publicly announced or later printed.
B. “REGULARLY GIVEN” OBJECTIONS YIELD FEWER
OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONGRESSIONAL MEDDLING

In the election of 1872, the “denominator problem” would not
have altered the outcome.117 The problem arises when different
methods of calculating the denominator could lead to different
outcomes. And by characterizing appointment problems as counting
problems, objectors wrongly increase the power of the House to
choose the next president.118
Imagine a hypothetical Electoral College in which Carrie
Candidate defeats Norman Nominee 282–256. The whole number of
electors appointed is 538, a majority of which is 270. During the
counting of electoral votes, members object to counting 20 electoral
votes from Pennsylvania for Carrie Candidate on the grounds that
voter fraud and irregularities call into doubt whether those electors
were the actual winning slate.
If the objection is that these electors were not lawfully appointed,
those electors should be taken out of both the numerator and
denominator in the calculation of electoral votes. That is, the
Id.
Id. at 4–5 & n.9.
117 See id. at 5 (“President Grant was victorious by whichever standard was used. He
received 286 electoral votes out of the 352 electoral votes counted, or out of the potential 364
electoral votes if the contested votes from Arkansas and Louisiana were included . . . .”).
118 Siegel emphasizes that members of Congress “avoided addressing the issue in the
[Electoral Count Act].” Siegel, supra note 35, at 654. But he recognizes that “[i]f the problem
were in an elector’s appointment, that may differ from the problem with the way an appointed
elector behaved in office.” Id. at 653 n.678. The form of the objection informs the Twelfth
Amendment analysis, as this subpart demonstrates. While the Electoral Count Act is the
mechanism for translating objections into outcomes, the Twelfth Amendment outlines the
consequence of those objections.
115
116
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electors were never “appointed,” and under the Twelfth Amendment
Congress ascertained “a majority of the whole number of electors
appointed.”119 If the objection is sustained, Carrie Candidate
receives 262 electoral votes to Norman Nominee’s 256. But now, the
whole number of electors appointed is 518, a majority of which is
260. Carrie Candidate still wins a majority.
But if the objection that these electors were not lawfully
appointed is concealed within an objection to the counting of votes
cast by these electors (i.e., that their votes were not “regularly
given”), the scenario changes. If the objection is sustained, Carrie
Candidate still leads 262–256. But the appointment of the electors
was not the formal objection, and Congress still recognizes 538
lawfully appointed electors. That means a candidate still needs 270
electoral votes to win the election, and the tally becomes 262 for
Carrie Candidate, 256 for Norman Nominee, and 20 uncounted. No
candidate has received a majority, and the House chooses the next
president in a contingent election (with a similar scenario in the
Senate to choose the next vice president).120 It is much easier to
throw an election to the House in such a scenario.
Abuse of the “regularly given” objection increases the likelihood
that Congress chooses the next president and vice president. When
a member of Congress objects to a vote as not “regularly given,” it
should be construed as an objection only to the vote cast, not to the
appointment of the elector. This interpretation is more consistent
with the text of the Twelfth Amendment and makes it more difficult
to meddle in the outcome of the election.

V. CONCLUSION
There are many other objections that members of Congress may
wish to raise in the counting of electoral votes. Whether those are
constitutionally permissible or wise matters of policy is for another
article. But under the Electoral Count Act, “regularly given”
U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
See Elaine Kamarck, What Happens If Trump and Biden Tie in the Electoral College?,
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/10/21/whathappens-if-trump-and-biden-tie-in-the-electoral-college/ (“If there is no winner in the
Electoral College, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 3 states that the decision goes to the House of
Representatives while the Senate picks the vice president.”).
119
120
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confines the objections of members of Congress to a discreet body of
controversies. Pre-appointment controversies, in contrast, typically
benefit from the protection of the “safe harbor” deadline.
In a way, these objections feel anachronistic. Political parties vet
their candidates, who then face extensive public exposure, so we
should not anticipate that ineligible candidates would receive a
material number of electoral votes. Formal requirements are closely
adhered to by the states—even in times of pandemic.121 The
National Archives provide extensive procedural instructions and
detailed checklists for states to ensure their compliance.122
Moreover, thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo
v. Washington, it appears that states may enforce rules that replace
faithless electors,123 reducing concerns that electors will vote for
ineligible candidates or under the influence of bribery. At the very
least, they provide the narrow universe for objections, and they offer
a principled basis for members of Congress to reject extraneous
objections in future presidential election counting controversies.

121 See, e.g., New York’s Electors to Meet in Person With Virus Precautions, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 11, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-new-york-albanyhillary-clinton-0e68113895704443a1b36a77acfa24c0 (“Gov. Andrew Cuomo, one of the state’s
29 electors, said Friday that state law [concerning where electors cast their ballots] requires
an in-person meeting at the State Capitol . . . .”).
122 See
For State Officials, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/electoralcollege/state-officials (last updated Aug. 6, 2020) (detailing the responsibilities of state
officials in the electoral vote certification process).
123 See 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (holding that “a State may . . . penalize an elector for
breaking his pledge and voting for someone other than the presidential candidate who won
his State’s popular vote”); Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (mem.) (same).
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